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This paper examines the academic soundness of the Pareto welfare criterion as a nonnative rule 
for evaluat ing alternative economic inequality scenarios and suggests that the cri terion has several 
weaknesses, which wear off its usefulness: First, the Pareto principle is of limited usc in the 
inequality debate, because labour markets hardly satisfy the conditions of perfect competit ion, the 
pivota l assumpt ion of the theory. Second, the proposi tion, competi tive equilibrium leads to 
'COllllllon good ' of society. is difficu lt to defend. Th ird , the Parctian welfare economics barely 
answers the questions society demands, because perfect competi tion docs not guarantee fairness 
in the determination of relative prices in the initial situation of income distribution. Fourth , the 
marg ina l productivity principle does not determine how, profits, the huge surpluses generated by 
the businesses, are distributed. Fifth, income dist ribution is a political issue, but Pareto's primary 
motivation was to alienate the di str ibution debate from policy and pol itical discourses. Final1y, the 
public earning structure is much marc equitable than that of the private seClor. This brings out a 
very serious question: which earning stflJcturc reflccts improvement in social welfare: public or 
private? 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A survey conducted in America in 2020 shows that median salary of Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) of the top 100 US companies was US$33 .4 million (Lewis 2003). If 
these CEOs are assumed to work eighty hours a week, then their hourly income tUI1lS 
out to be about $773 1.00. Compared to thi s, the hourly incomes of high public 
offi cials, professionals and ordinary workers appear pathetic: Genera l Tommy 
Franks, the fO l1ll er Joint Chiefs of Staff of US military, earned an hourl y sa lary 
$69. 10, whi Ie the average earn ings of doctors, school teachers and fire-fi ghters were 
respectively the following- $60. 14, $28.01, and $ 17. 16. The average hourly wage of 
an ordinary worker was $16.23, while the downsized and unskilled workers got half 
of that rate. 
Is thi s income di stribution justifi ed in a democratic society? Some 
economists beli eve that such distri bution is not economicall y justified but also 
socially des irab le. Feldstein (1999, p.32) says: "Accord ing to official statistics, the 
distribution of income has become increas ingly unequal during the past two decades. 
A common reaction in the popular press, in political debate, and in academ ic 
discussions is to regard the increased inequality as a problem that demands new 
redi stributi ve policies. I disagree [emphas is added]. [be li eve that inequality as such 
is not a problem and that it would be wrong to design policies to reduce it. What 
policy shou ld address is not inequality but poverty." III different words, Welch 
(1999) expresses a similar op inion: "[ ... ] I believe inequality is an economic 'good ' 
that has received too much bad press. [ also think you will agree that it is a good, 
which like any other, can be scarce or overly abu ndant. I am neither trying to praise 
nor defend poverty, and I hope it is understood that the link between wages and 
income is not especially c lose, particularly at lower incomes where non-employment 
dominates. " 
This unqualified support for promoting economic inequality seems to 
contrad ict the principle of promoting equality among citizens- the max im on which 
the democratic political system is founded . Then, the original source of inequality 
among human beings is natu ral, meaning that, if inequality were so good as is 
clai med, the humankind wo uld have perpetual peace and progress in soc iety. The 
reason there are so much interests in the issue, is because the creation of humane 
society requires curtailing unequal powers of individuals, both natural and soc ial , 
through law and govel1lment. And democracy is believed to be the most desirable 
political system that can achieve thi s goal. 
Thus, questions naturally beg about the theoretical foundation of such 
overwhelming opinions, which is the famous Pareto principle- economists' value-
judgement criterion for making choices in formulating public policy: " I am interested 
onl y in evaluating changes that increased incomes of high-income indi"iduals 
without decreasing the income of others. Such a change clearly sati sfies the 
commonsense Pareto principle: It is good because it makes some people better off 
without making some people worse off. I think such a change should be regarded as 
good even though it increases inequality (Feldstein 1999, p.34) ." 
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The above nOl1l1ative judgement is critical to understanding the nature of 
public debate on economic inequality. For, public po li cy, of which economic policy 
is the most important component, is a po lit ical issue. Public poli cy concel1ls the 
acti vities of government- the most powerful politica l institution in the state. 
Therefore, the socia l des irabi lity of an economic poli cy should be assessed from the 
political perspect ive of society under rev iew. The economic po li cy regarding the 
distributio n of income of a communist coun try cannot be compared with that of a 
non-communist country, because the objectives of these polit ica l systems are 
fu ndamentall y different. Similarl y, in the category of non-communi st country, 
objecti ves of democracy cannot be compared with those of a non-democracy, 
because government 's ob liga ti ons towards cit izens are very different. 
This paper ex amines whether the Pareto principle is an appropriate ana lytical 
tool for formulating economic policy in democrati c soc iety. The nex t secti on 
exami nes the theory of 'economi c inequality' from politica l and econom ic 
perspecti ves. Section III di scusses the Pareto principle in order to pinpoi nt its major 
economic logics. Secti on rv analyses the limitations of this popular economic value-
judgement in eva luating economic polic ies of democracy. And the paper is 
concluded in Section V. 
II. INEQU ALITY : POLITICAL AN D ECONOMIC 
Political In equ a lity: Normative Pr inc ip le 
The word , 'inequa lity', means the want of equality between objects or ideas of the 
same kind , meaning that each object or idea is equal to itself. Therefore, we perceive 
inequal ity when objects or ideas of same kind differ wit h respect to certa in criterion 
or criteria. The idea of inequality thi s paper concerned with refers to three main 
kinds of human relat ions- social , po litical and economic. Intellectual inquiries about 
the issue first appeared in moral and politica l discourses, suggest ing that 
examinations of economic aspects of inequality should follow politica l di scussions. 
Besides thi s hi storical reason, political discourses set the tone of economic 
discussions. 
One of the most classic treatments of politi ca l inequality is Ro usseau's ( 1992) 
Discourse 011 the Origin of Illequality. He wrote thi s discourse for the Academy of 
Dijon's essay competition- ' What is the origin of inequa lity between men and is it 
authorized by the natural law 'ry In answering thi s quest ion , Rousseau conceives of 
two kinds of ineq uality in the human spec ies- natura l or phys ical , and moral or 
political. Phys ical inequa liti es, which consist of differences in age, health , bodily 
strength and qualities of minds or sou ls, are inborn. In other words, god, taking the 
tenn in its most secular sense, institutes natural inequalities among human beings. 
The other kind of inequa lity is described as moral or politi ca l, ' because it depends on 
a kind of convention and is estab li shed or at least authorized, by the consent of men'. 
Thi s latter type of inequality consists in different privileges enjoyed by some at the 
expense of others, such as being richer, more honoured, more powerful than they, or 
even causing themselves to be obeyed by them. 
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The interest in the subj ect, there fore, must necessarily concern with mora l or 
po liti cal inequalities that are created through social customs and conventions, va lues 
and beli efs, and law and government. Since natural inequalities are nati ve qualities 
of human beings, there must be inequalities in the di stribution o f social resources and 
pos itions. Accordingly, an inquiry in the subj ect concerns the foundation o f politi ca l 
inequalities that members of society vo luntaril y accept as just or fair. Rousseau 
suggests that all citi zens should be di stingui shed and favo ured in propol1ion to 
services they render to soc iety, because a ll members of the state owe its services 
proporti onate to their talents and contributions. For th is reason, Socrates, Rousseau 
says, praised the Atheni ans for knowing how to di stingui sh which o f the two so rts of 
equali ty was more soc iall y des irable- proportioning the same advan tages 
indiffe rently to all citi zens, and di stributing them acco rdi ng to each one's merit. The 
Atheni an able po liti cians bani shed the unjust equality that does not differentiate 
between wicked and good men and adhered invio lably to that equality which rewards 
and punishes each acco rd ing to one's merit. 
Inequality, or d istributi ve inj usti ce, therefore, does not mean differences, for 
example, in salaries between a j an itor and a un iversity professor. For paying them 
equal sa lari es wo uld be the worst inj ust ice. Thi s is because thi s distribut ion system 
wou ld ignore di fferenti al merit o f services these people provide to soc iety: 
Inequality, or di stributi ve injusti ce, concerns fund amenta ll y with the fairness of 
di ffe rence or di spari ty that ex ists in the di stribution of socia l resources and pos it ions 
in democratic soc iety. 
Economic Inequality: Concepts and Measures 
This paper is concerned with the fairness o f di sparity that ex ists in the di stribution of 
economic resources in democrati c soc iety. More spec ifica ll y, thi s paper investi gates 
the nornlat ive principles of judgi ng the fa irness of d iffere nce in the di stribut io n of 
national income in democratic society. The vast econo mic literature, deve loped on 
the issue over centuries, dea ls primari ly w ith two aspects o f thi s important soc ial 
vari ab le- concept of income and methods of measuri ng inequality in income 
distribution. 
National income is defined as the sum total of the values of goods and 
servi ces that soc iety produces over a given peri od o f time, nonnall y a year, by 
employing the factors of producti on it commands: land, labour, capital and 
entrepreneurshi p. Concerning the di stribution o f thi s income, economists employ two 
ideas- functional di stri bution and size or personal di stribution. Funct ional 
distri bution re fers to c lai ms on nati onal o utput that results from the ownershi p of 
factors of production and is paid as rent (land), wages and salari es (l abour), interest 
(capital) and profit (entrepreneurship) . The size di stri bution, on the other hand. 
invo lves the actual di vision of income among individuals and households. Evidentl y. 
functi onal distribution is a theoretical concept that parti cul arl y interests members of 
economic di sc ipl ine. The size or personal di stribution, on the contrary, is aver) 
policy issue, for which it is of constant concern of policymakers and soc ia ll ) 
interested indi viduals. 
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From the perspecti ve of personal di s tribution, the important issue is 
individ uals' access to, and control over, economic reso urces, because their welfare 
depends upon the possession o f these resources. There are several ways to m easure 
thi s critica l variab le- be fore and after tax incomes, monthl y, an nual and Ii fetime 
incomes, wage incomes, etc- w hi ch suggests that the meas ures of income inequality 
are sensitive to how income is defined . Thus, the same measure produces different 
inequality indices if mo re than one defin ition of income is used in the resea rch. 
Methodologically, two types of income ineq ual ity estimato rs are ava ilable in 
economic li teratu re: posi ti ve o r objecti ve and nonn at ive or subj ecti ve (Sen 1973). 
The posi tive estimato rs include stati stical too ls that ca lculate re lati ve variati ons in 
incomes received by different individuals or households. The nonnati ve notion , on 
the o ther hand, conccl1l s the soc ial welfare aspect of income distribution. For 
examp le, a hi gher degree of income inequality is nonnall y thou ght to be an indicator 
of a lower leve l of soc ial welfare for a g iven amount of nat ional income and vice 
versa . 
Thus, there is a duality in the econom ists' conception o f incom e inequality. 
This cou ld create a great deal of confusion in theo retical as well as pol icy 
discussions , if the ha l1l1 0nious co rrespondence between the two measures is not 
c learly comprehended. Without nonnative maxim, obj ecti ve measures are merely 
numbers having little policy implicati ons, w hil e wi thout objective m easu res, the 
nonnative notion is just intellec tual specu lat ion with littl e implications for poli cy 
analysis and fOI1l11ilation. 
Like different concep tions of income, there are differen t measures of 
distribution of income and hence different inequal ity ind ices (Ryscavage, 1999 ; Sen, 
1973). These measures include: income classes, income share, percentile ratios, 
range, coefficient of variati on, variance of Natural Logarithm of income, Gin i index, 
Theil index, Atk inson index, etc. Since the technical aspects of incom e inequa lity 
measures are no interest to thi s paper, thi s di scussion will not be ex tended any 
further. 
What the above paragraphs say is that there a re severa l definitions of 
personal income as well as measures of its di stribution . Consequentl y, one wou ld get 
different pictures of the state of inequality in a country depending upon the concepts 
and measures used. But, these different measures do not necessaril y tell us w hether 
the created inequality was justified . For example, Ryscavage (1999) measures that 
the income inequa lity in America- as indicated by the coeffi c ient of vari ati on-
increased from 0.775 in 1979 to 0.909 in 1989. In o ther words, accordin g to 
coefficient of vari at ion , income inequality in Ameri ca increased by 17.3 percent 
duri ng a period of ten years, whil e the G ini index shows only a 9 percent increase 
(0.376 in 1979 to 0.4 10 in 1989) ove r the same period . This difference in changes in 
the degree of inequa lity is due to different statistical tool s used. However, they say 
little about whether the 17.3 percent or the 9 percent increases in incom e inequality 
were desirable. This is a nOl1l1 ative/po li cy questi on that needs normati ve principles 
to answer. And the answer to this normative analysis will invariab ly depend upon 
one's moral aptitude about the ro le of equality in democrati c society. 
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III. THE PARETO PRINCIPLE 
Feldstein's Arguments 
The normati ve notion that economists use to judge alternative scenarios of income 
inequality is ca ll ed Pareto principle. To examine the appropri ateness o[ thi s princ iple 
in sett ling this cri ti ca l policy, the fundamental ideas of welfare economics are 
d iscussed below briefly. The di scuss ion begins w ith the points that Martin Feldste in 
makes in hi s influential article pllbli shed in the Public in.leresl. For two reasons, hi s 
arguments are pal1icularly important. First, he addresses the Am erican people to 
miti gate their concel1l over increasing ineq uality in the country. Second , he app li es 
the theo retical logic of we lfare economics to do thi s. 
Feldstein 'rejects' all the conventional arguments, w hich ei ther supports or 
c riti cise economic inequali ty. First, he criti c izes those who consider increas ing 
income ineq uality as soc ially undes irab le even though thi s increased incom e of the 
wea lthy did not come at the expense of the poor. Feldstein describes these peop le as 
'spiteful egalitari ans', because they cannot 'even stand the sight of others gettin g 
better orr. He justifi es hi s position with thi s exampl e: " Later today, a small magic 
bird appears and gives each Public interest subsc riber $ 1000. We wo uld all think 
that th is is a good thi ng. And yet, s ince Public interest subscrib ers undoubtedl y have 
above average incomes that would also increase ineq uality in the nation . I would 
think it would be wrong to consider these $1000 windfalls morall y suspect (p . 33).,,1 
Second, some economi sts and policy makers favour redistributive po li c ies 
and tax progressiv ity on the ground that 'the soc ial value of incremental income' is 
negati ve. In other wo rds, the socia l marg inal utility of incom e decl ines as incomes of 
some indi viduals ri se relative to others. Thus, an extra $100 means a lot to an 
individ ual or a family that eal1ls $ 10,000 a year, but thi s income might mean nothing 
to a millionaire. Feldstein counters thi s group in two ways. First ly, he invokes the 
conventional ordinal argument that the interpersonal comparison of utility cannot be 
ach ieved in any uncontroversial manner, because there is no objective way to 
compare how much pleasure two different individuals get from money or from goods 
that money buys2 Secondly, he contends that the 'Gini coefficient'- nonna ll y 
calculated to support this argument- has a built-in limitation. It meas ures the 
concentration of incomes in a nation, which m eans that a hi gher Gini coefficient 
implies higher income inequality. Since the Gini coefficient does not consider the 
Pareto principle, it wo uld revea l a higher leve l of income ineq uality although the 
Pare to princip le might have been sati sfi ed . In other words, the Gini coeffic ient is an 
automat ic affinnation of the negativity of the soc ial marginal uti lity of high incom es-
' that something bad has occurred when the well to do become better orr 3 
Third , Feldstein asserts that hi s opinion does not depend upon functional 
arguments, which some authors offer in the defence of inequality: Firstly, 'an 
uneq ua l di stribution of income may contribute to general economic growth, and 
there fore, to the poor's standard of living, by increas ing national saving ra tes. 
Second ly, inequality is a reflection of Schumpeterian innovation, which eventuall y 
helps most, if no t all, ind ividuals in the economy'. Third ly, the affluent support for 
charitab le causes is a 'high culture' in democratic soc iety. Feldstein says: " I am not 
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relying on such arguments here, because I want to stress that there is nothing wrong 
with an increase in the well -being of the wea lthy or wi th an increase in inequality 
that results from a ri se in high incomes (pp. 35-36)." 
Pa retian Valu e Jud gemen t 
Vilfredo Pareto, who obtained degrees in mathematical and physical sciences and in 
engineering fro m the Univers ity of Turin , began his career as an engi neer at the Joint 
Stock Railway Company of Florence in April 1870- a pro fess ion he continued for 
more than twenty years. He then joined the University of Lausanne in Apri I 1892 as 
the cha ir of Po liti ca l Economy and began hi s new academic career in economics and 
sociology (Bus ino, 1987). His training as an engineer, hi s comma nd in mathematics, 
hi s passion to classica l Greek, Roman and Rena issance humani sti c literature and hi s 
profess iona l acti vity o f more than twent y years as an industrial engineer ev idently 
innuenced Pareto 's academ ic interests. He was a strong advocate of laissez- faire 
po lic ies in his early life and later Ieant toward fascism impressed by Benito 
Musso lini's success to resto re order in Ital y (Feiwel and Feiwel, 1991 ). 
Pareto's politi cal pass ion fou nd well ex pressed in hi s famous book, Manual oj 
political Ecol/olln ·, which seems to be treated as the Bible o f we i fare economics. He 
begins hi s book by outlining three mai n objectives that a writer might have in 
studying political economy. First, the writer might gather together prescriptions that 
are useful to private indi vid ual s and public authoriti es in their soc ial activities . Here 
the writer is simply interested in private and soc ial usefulness in stud ying poli ti cal 
economy. Second, the writer might have good doctrine that shows all kinds of 
benefit to the natio n and the human race. The purpose here is aga in useful ness, but a 
much more general and less prosaic usefuln ess. The basic difference between the two 
objectives is that the fornler is a co llection of precepts , while the latter is a treatise on 
morality. Finally, the writer mi ght intend only to search for unifonnit ies present in 
phenomenon, without worrying, in any way, with giving rec ipes or precepts, without 
seeking happiness, benefits, or we ll being of the humanity or the part of it. The pure 
purpose of the writer here is sc ientific; he wants to know and understand political 
economy, nothing more. Pareto' s purpose in writi ng the Manual is the third one: " 1 
ought to warn the reader that in thi s Manua l, I have in mind thi s thi rd obj ective 
exclusively. It is not that I deprecate the other two, 1 sincerely intend to distingui sh 
and separate the methods and to point out the one, which ,,·ill be adopted in thi s book 
(Pareto , 197 1, p. 2)." 
To acc urately understand Paretian welfare criterion, one should look at the 
purpose of his analysis. Hi s purpose in wri ting the Manual is enti re ly sc ientifi c, not 
anyway concerned with 'seeking happiness, benefits, or ,,·e ll being of the human ity 
or the part of it' . In o ther word, Pareto supp lies the economic disc ipline a pos itive 
analys is of the nornlative issue. Natura ll y, this welfare analysis ra ises two critical 
quest ions . First, can a n0l111at ive issue be examined w ith the methodology of posit ive 
economics? If the ans"·er were affi l111ative, then the divi sion of economi cs into 
positive and nonnati ve branches is of littl e meaning ful. Second, the fundamental 
objective of we lfare analysis is to improve soc ial welfare through choos ing 
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appropriate economic policy, suggesting that Paretian va lue judgement contradicts 
with the very objective of welfare economics. 
As noted above, economics is di vided into pos iti ve and nonnati ve parts from 
methodological perspectives . Positive part is concerned with analysing, in words of 
Nev ille Keynes (189 1), 'what is ' phenomenon, whil e nonnati ve economics is 
concerned with 'what ought to be' phenomenon. This nornlat ive branch of 
economics is nowadays ca ll ed welfare economi cs. It is the theory of how, and by 
what criteria, economi sts and policy makers make or ought to make choices between 
alternative poli cies and between good and bad inst ituti ons: "Theoretica l welfa re 
economics is ... that branch of stud y which endeavou rs to formulate propositions by 
whi ch we may rank, on the sca le of better or worse, alternati ve economic situations 
open to soc iety (Mishan , 1969, p. 13)." And the criteri a that econom ists and po li cy 
makers use to make their choices are the well -estab li shed welfare propositions of 
class ica l economi cs- perfect compet ition, free trade and direct taxation . Therefore. 
the ori gin of modern welfare economics can be traced back to Adam Smith , because 
he was the first to present a clear conceptual framework of how competition can lead 
to economic prosperity of non-communi st soc iety. Sm ith's theo ry of economic 
progress- economic welfare- can be described in tenns of three propositions: The 
firs t propos ition concerns a philosophical truth about the human nature; the second 
one predicts what could happen to total wealth of soc iety if individuals are no! 
prevented from materiali z ing their selfi shness; and the fina l proposition suggests 
what ought to be the nature of govenmlent policy concerning the pursuance o f 
economi c activities by private individual s. 
The first proposition says that individual s are persuaded by their native nature 
to undertake economic acti vi ti es for reali zing their selfi slmess, wh ich means, in 
economic tenns, that their motive is to accumulate wealth by using the resources. 
under their command, in the best poss ible ways. The second proposition states a 
belief about outcomes of the first assumption : if these selfi sh individuals are no! 
prevented from ac hieving their goals, economic we lfare of the entire soc iety w ill 
enhance because the invisible hand automaticall y transfonTIs the self-interest of 
many into the common good. Given that the first t\\·o propositions are true, the final 
proposition follows unambi guously- the best government policy for the growth of a 
nati on's wealth is that policy which governs least (Fe ldman, 1987). Smith drew thi s 
inference to counter the then rnercantili st trade policy recommendati on that 
restricting imports and facilitating exports could increase wealth of a nation. 
Thus, the fu ndamental theorem of welfare econom ics- that the lai ssez-fare 
public policy leads to the "common good" of a nation - is fimlly founded on the 
c lass ical conceptions of perfect competition and free trade. Thi s theorem is 
ordinari ly articul ated by sketching a general eq uili brium model of an economy as 
follows: Assume all consumers and producers are price takers meaning that 
indi vid uall y they are unable to influence market prices. Now given the se lfi sh nature 
of human character, individuals are supposed to be activated by two completel , 
different motives in their roles as consumers and producers. As consumers, they 
maximize utility subject to budget constraints, which suggests that they can be lured 
to buy more of the commodities they consume only by lowering prices. As 
producers, they max imize profits, which suggests that they can be persuaded to 
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supply more of the commodities they prod uce only if consumers are wi lling to pay 
hi gher prices. Eq uilibriu m is reached when demand and supp ly curves of the 
commodit y in quest ion intersect. Thi s mark et equ ilibrium is optimal as wel l as 
des irab le, because it takes place under perfect com petition. Feldman w rites: ''The 
in visib le hand of competit ion acts throu gh prices; th ey contain the infonnation about 
des ire and scarc it y that coord inate the actions of se lf-i nterested agent s. In the general 
eq uilibrium model, pri ces adjust to bring about equ ilibrium in the market for each 
and every good. Thi s, priccs adj ust until supply equal s demand . When that has 
occurred , and all indiv idua ls and fil1l1 S are maximizing utiliti es and profits, 
respectively, we have competitive equ ilibrium (Feldman, 1987 , p. 889)." 
Thi s well-known economic doctrine says th at we lfare economics- popularly 
perceived as the no rm ati , c sc ience of publi c po lic)nlaking- is founded on the va lue 
judgement of competiti ve eq uilibrium . Si nce the sub-discipline's primary concel1l is 
judging a lternative policv scenarios that the pub li c aut horit ies encounter in 
per fOlnlin g their everyda) duti es, they need a criterion to make their choice. And thi s 
much needed jUdging criterion is suppli ed by another type ofvaluej udgcmcnt, ca lled 
Pareto principle. It says ex actly w hat Feldstein has stated : 'a change is good if it 
makes someone belle r off ·.\, ithout making anyone else worse ofr . 
Thi s Paretian pri J:c iple of judging alternative policy regi mes ava il able to 
sovereign soc iety contains three importan t ideas (Rowley and Peacock, 1975) : ( 1) 
Society has an ordinal socia l welfare func ti on whose arguments inc lude the le,'el of 
welfare (utility) of indi vidua ls compri sing the soc iety. (2) An individual is the best 
j udge of their o,,'n welfa~e meaning that no one is al lowed to impose hi s or her 
preferences on others. (31 If any change in the al loca tion of resources increases the 
we lfare of at least one indiv idua l without reducing welfare of any o ther individual , 
then thi s change is trea ted as improving social welfare. There are three first -order 
conditions for the Pareto optimal choice of a policy regime (Ng, 1980): (i) exchange 
optimum- the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between any pair of goods be the 
same for a ll ind ivi dua ls, I ii) production opti mum- MRS between any pair of factors 
must be the same for a ll units us ing the fac tors. (iii) top- level optimum- for any pair 
of reproducib le goods, tl:e common MRS must be equal to their marginal rate of 
transfol1l1ation (MRT). T~e second-order o r the sufficient conditi ons for the Pareto 
optimal soc ial choice are that the ind i fference curves rep resen tin g MRS between 
goods and the isoq uams representing MRS between factors of producti on be 
respective ly COll\'ex and concave. These requirements of convexity and concavity are 
equiva lent to the assump:ions of the dim ini shing MRS (both for goods and fac tors) 
and the diminishing MRT. 
IV. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL LlMITAIONS OF 
PARETO PRINC IP LE 
The question that thi s paper has set out to in vest igate is whether the Pareto principle 
is an appropriate econol:l ic tool to judge socia l desirabi lity of altelllative public 
po licy measures in democracy. Such a quest ion is supposed to be provocative, 
because it manifestly intends to insinuate the Yery foundation of welfare economics. 
As one welfare econom is t remarks: "The Paretian value judgement is on ly a value 
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judgement. It may well be rejected by some. But be fore it is rejected , either explic itly 
or by implication, it must be remembered that virtually the entire edi fice of economic 
theory as we know it is today built on Paretian premises. If these premi ses are 
rejected, that theory becomes irrelevant to the world in wh ich we live in (Wi nch 
1971, pp 190-200)." 
Yet, as Ravi Kanbur (2002) says in the Corne ll confere nce on 'Conceptual 
Chall enges in Poveny and Inequality', it is now time to develop a new conceptua l 
ferment of welfare economics . For, the old one- concep tuali sed, conso lidated and 
applied to policy debates over the past three decades- has ex hausted all its potenti a ls. 
And given the severity of inequality situation in the non-communist world, one 
mi ght argue that it is abso lutely necessary to put the who le opus of welfare 
economics under review. More speci fi cally, it seems quite imp0l1ant to re-examine 
the theoret ical merits of Pareto principle in maki ng poli cy dec isions concerning 
income di stribution and practi cal issues of income di stribution that the popular 
med ia, po li cy makers and pol iticians are concerned about. This section attempts to 
make a few points in thi s regard . 
First, the assumption of Paretian welfare theory is at variance with rea lit y. 
Thi s theo ry is founded on the assumption of perfec t competition, which says that 
both consumers and producers are price takers, meaning that they individuall y have 
no influence on market prices. This scenario has littl e re lati on to the reality of labo ur 
market. While the labour supply function suffic ientl y satisfies the requirements o f 
perfect competition , the labour demand function does not. Then the labour suppl ) 
funct ion is continuously shifted downward through popUlation increase in 
developing countri es and in case of developed countri es, through manufacturing 
carried out in the developing countri es by the multinationals. Therefore, the merits of 
perfect competiti on assumption are limited for judging rea l world income 
di stribution problem. 
Second , Paretian welfare economics is founded on the va lue-judgement that 
the laissez- faire economic idea is a des irable policy regime for democratic society. 
This inference has been derived from three propos itions of welfare economics 
described above and therefore, constitutes the conclusion of categorical deducti ve 
syllogism system of logic, where the first two propositions serve as premises, wh ile 
the last one as the conclusion (Harri son III, 1992) . By the rul es of logic, an argument 
is deducti vely va lid if and only if the conclusion is true when its premises are all true 
too. If thi s princ iple is applied, the first value judgement of welfare economics turns 
out to be lacking in truth-value, because the second proposition, which c laims that 
the competitive equilibrium leads to 'common good ' of the soc iety, is hardl ) 
defendab le. 
Third, the Pareto principle states that the change in the ex isting policy reg ime 
is des irab le if it makes at least one individual better off whil e none worse off. In 
other words, the merit of Paretian value-judgement li es in the soc ial desirability of 
the initial income distribution. For, if the initial distribution is unjust, then 
subsequent changes would only worsen the social distribution of income, instead of 
improving it. 
Although the idea of initial position is quite new in economics discipline , it 
has a prominent place in both social theorizing and actual governance, toady ca ll ed. 
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public administration. The idea first originated in religion , the most anc ient fonn of 
public admi nist ration. Thus, in the l ewish-Chri stian-Is lamic tradition , everything on 
ea lih belongs to God, Who made Adam His heir. Therefore, the initial di stribution 
begins from Adam. Si nce this ancestry relates all human beings, reli gions teach their 
followers to give charity generously and not to acc umulate exccssive wea lth . Ln 
po litical philosophy, the idea seems to have ori ginated in Ari stot le. He began hi s 
famo us treatise, The Politics, with thi s statement: " We sha ll , I think , in this as in 
other subjects, get the best view o f the matter if look at the natural growth o f things 
from the very beginning (1962, p. 26)." However, it was Hobbes, who made the idea 
of initi al position famous in politi ca l ana lys is. This initial position, desc ribed as the 
state of nature, was the condition of human soc iety, where there was no civil 
govemment. Men li ved by thc rul es of nature and because they were eq ual in temlS 
of both physical and mental powers, it was a state of war. To escape this si tuation , 
they made a soc ial contract to place themselves under c ivil govemment headed by a 
king. The idea of soc ial contract also became the starting points in Locke and 
Rousseau's political philosophies. Thus, from political perspecti ves, the fomlation of 
civil society through soc ial contract is understood as the initial posit ion. 
To economi sts , however, the init ia l posit ion refers to the economy's general 
equ ilibrium si tuation determined under the environment of perfect competition 
where economic effic ienc ies are attai ned in production of output, exchange of 
commodities and equi ty in income di stributio n (Sa lvatore 199 1). And given thi s 
initia l general equilibrium situation, a poli cy is to be ca ll ed Pareto optimal if it can 
al ter this input mix , or commodity mi x, or nature of income di stribution, which 
makes some indi vidual better off without mak ing anyone worse-off. Two limitat ions 
of thi s theory seem obvious. First, the theory is articulated on a criti ca l val ue-
judgement ; it assumes that relative prices detennined under perfect compet ition are 
socia lly desirable . However, perfect competit ion says li tt le about the faimess or 
des irability of relat ive prices of either ou tputs or inputs. For example, demand in 
economics is defined as des ire backed by purchasing power. The theory of demand 
does not discuss how the consumer's purchasing power is determined, meaning that 
the demand theory is defic ient from welfare point of view. On the other hand, 
economists make two mistakes in discussing the issue in input market. First, 
economists treat the theory of di stribution as an ex tens ion of the theory of value 
(Gupta 1960). It is just a prob lem of pricing the factors of production, meaning that 
all the four factors receive equa l treatment. There is no difference between land and 
labour. This is perhaps one reason why the theory of di stribution is being excluded 
from the defin ition of economics: "Economics is the stud y how societi es use scarce 
reso urces to produce va luab le commodities and di stribute them among di fferent 
people (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2004)." If we accept thi s view, there is little reason 
to be concemed about income distribu tion and economic inequality. Second, real 
markets, particul arl y the labour market, are far from meeting the conditions of 
perfect market. Therefore, Paretian principle, no matter how elegant it is in tenns of 
mathematics, is of little use for detennining practica l policy issues. 
Fourth, the ideas of four factors of production were conceived when the 
banking sector was very underdeve loped . Therefore, the owners of capital and 
entrepreneurs were ordinaril y the same individuals, which suggest that there were 
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little needs to be concerned about the difference between interests and profits earned 
by the business c lass. Thi s is no longer true today, because capita ls borrowed from 
banks const itute an overwhelm ing proportion of investments made by modem 
compani es . The distribution theory says that each facto r of production is supposed to 
be paid acco rding to it s marginal productivity, which is determined by competitive 
markets. If we assume that rents, wages and interests o f borrowed capital are 
determ ined by the market forces, then questions arise as to whom the surp lus belong 
and how thi s surplus is to be distributed. [n other words, the Pareto principle of 
income distribution seem s to have limited use today, since the economic 
enviro nments of both production and consumption have changed dramati ca ll y. 
Fi fth , income d istribution is a pol iti ca l issue. Therefore, questions naturall y 
arise as to whether the Pareto principle does at all address this po lit ica l concern. Sen 
ri ght ly says, "Much of modem welfare economics is concerned with prec isely that 
set of questi ons which avo id judgements on income distribution altogether. .. The so-
call ed 'basic' theorem of welfare economics is concerned with the relation between 
competitive equi li bria and Pareto optimality. The concep t Pareto optimal ity was 
evolved prec isely to cut o ut the need for distributional j udgement ... The almost 
single-minded concern of modem we lfare economics with Pareto optimality does not 
make that engaging branch of study particularly suitab le fo r investi gating problems 
of inequality (Sen, 1973 pp. 6-7) ." 
Fina lly, this paper was inspired by the public interest in the income inequa lity 
issue in democratic society, America in particular; and its main concern is to see 
whether the Pareto principle could address this issue. For the convenience of 
discussion, income distributions reported at the beginning of the paper are 
reproduced here: While, the CEOs of 100 top co rporations eam hourl y US$773 1 .0; 
General Tommy Franks eam s $69 .10, doctors $60. 14, ordinary workers $ 16.23 etc. 
This data show two distinct eaming structures in involve public and private 
sectors of the non-communi st soc iety. This suggests that the appropriate examinat ion 
of the equity aspect o f income distribution in the non-communist soc iety invo lves 
comparing individual eamings in each sec tor of employment. Thus, Genera l Frank ' s 
wage income should be compared with that of a private, while the eaming of an 
ord inary worker in the private sec tor should be compared with that of a CEO. And if 
we do thi s, we w ill see that there is a remarkable degree of equality in wage structure 
in the public sector, which reflects the merits of serv ices provided by each employee. 
However, this judgement cannot be extended to the private sector. It is difficult to 
comprehend any good reason for the 476 times income deferential in the pri vate 
sector. This begs a vital question: Which earning structure reflects social welfare-
public or private? 
Then there is a real question about how the private sector determines 
remunerations of its top executives. Suppose General Franks retires from military 
and is hired as the CEO of a large corporation. His earning w ill instantly jump to the 
average CEO rate. Does thi s mean that the public sector underestimated the merit of 
his serv ices to society? Is the responsibility of CEO is more valuable than that of the 
Chief of Staffs of US anned forces? An affirmative answer to these questions wou ld 
imply that the earning structure of the private sector, not the public sector, reflects 
social welfare. Is a universi ty professor qualified to do the job of a CEO, if they want 
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to take up thi s career? If the answer were yes, then it would further confirm the 
irrationality of the earn ing structure of the public secto r. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Economic inequality, measured by variations in personal income distribution, has 
worsened worrisomely in weste l11 democracies. This phenomenon has provoked 
popular demands for formulating public po li cy measures to counteract the ominous 
inequality trend . However, many eminent econom ists are of the view that the 
prevai li ng income di stribu tion is not onl y economical ly important, but al so sociall y 
desirab le . This controversial poli cy prescription is justifi ed by the Pareto Principl e-
econom ists' va lue judgement abo ut publi c policy cho ice- which says that an income 
distribution is soc iall y des irable if it makes someone better off without mak ing 
anyone worse ofr. 
To input some fresh ideas in thi s crucial social po licy debate, the paper 
examines the intell ec tual foundation of the Pareto Principl e. The paper first clarifies 
the conception of inequality by inspecting the principle from both political and 
economic viewpoint. From political viewpoint, the analysis of inequality or 
' di stributive injusti ce' is concel11 ed with deternlining the fairness of disparity in the 
distribution o f soc ial resources and positions. Economists, on the other hand , study 
inequality as a problem of di stribution of national income. Although, there are two 
types of income di stribution measures- functional and persona l- the soc ial debate on 
inequality is concerned only wi th the personal distribution. Personal di stribution is 
also analysed ,,·ith two types of measures- one objective and the other normative. 
The objective measures include coeffic ient of variation, Gini coefficient, Theil index 
etc., whi le the most popular normative measure is the Pareto principle. 
After thi s preliminary discussion, the paper briefly di scussed the Paretian 
welfare economics in order to eva luate it s intellectual ab ility to settl e practical policy 
questions and examine its merit in judging altel11ative poli cy scenarios . The ana lysis 
shows that the Pareto principle has severa l theoretical as well as practi cal limitations 
that dimini shes it usefulness in answering questions demanded by policymakers and 
policy ana lysts . Here four such limitations are particularly underlined . 
First, Paretian improvement in social welfare critically defends upon the 
faimess of initial income di st ribution . However, perfect competition does not 
guarantee the fail11ess in the detennination of relative prices, while economi sts treat 
the di stribution theory as a special case of value, meaning they do not differentiate 
between, say, how rewards of land and labour are determined . Thus, the Paretian 
welfare economics hardl y anal yses the issues that soc iety demands. Second, rewards 
of the factors of production are detemlined by the marginal productivity theory. If 
we assume that rents, wages and interests are detennined by this theory, then 
questions arise how the huge surpluses, profits, generated by the businesses are 
di vided among the people invo lved with the business. Third , income distribution is a 
po liti cal issue. But Pareto has consc iously tried to separate income distribution 
debate from politica l and policy di scuss ions. Finally, by invoking the Pareto 
principle, economists seem to be avoid ing the real issues of public debate on 
personal di stribution of income. Persona l income distribution truly refers to the 
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division of income generated by a gro up of people wo rking together and therefore, 
ought to be ana lysed with reference to the sector of employment. Thus, Tommy 
Franks' earn ing should be compared wi th that of a private, wh ile an ordinary 
worker's salary should be compared with that of the CEO. History testifies that the 
public eallling structure is much more equitab le than that of the private sec tor. This 
poses a very seri ous questi on: Which earning structure reflects improvement in 
social welfare: public or private? 
In spite of all these and other de fects pinpointed earli er, economists are 
obsessed with Pareto's efficiency criterion. They have made it as the fou ndation of 
modern welfare economics- the branch of economic science that deal s wi th 
nOllllative public po li cy issues- although Pareto hi mself has clearly stated that 
society's welfare or happi ness is not his concern . However, in their obsession, they 
have overlooked a serious imp li cation of Pareto principle that concerns social and 
po liti cal stability of society: 
By the Pareto Principle, an income di stri bution is economica ll y justified and 
socia ll y des irable if it makes someone better off without making anyone worse off. 
Thus, the income of the rich can be increased enonnously without ad\'erse ly 
affecting the income of the poor. This, in turn, wou ld imply improvement in soc ial 
wei fare, because the rich are better off, while the poor are not worse off. Thus. by the 
Pareto Principle, increased inequality is tantamount to improved socia l we lfare. One 
could then conclude- by paraphrasing Feldstein 's argument- that the Pareto Principle 
is an automatic a ffillll ati on of the public policy that inspires inequality in democrat ic 
society! And since un fa ir inequali ty is the true source of all confl icts in society, thi s 
policy prescription necessaril y invites more social and pol itical unrest ' 
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